[terraX]

well... one thing is crystal clear from seeing this Post 10/19 reaction .. that we just dont give a damn about history .. 2 years ago i read this gem of a book called "THE MITROKHIN ARCHIVE II - KGB and the World". (its based upon thousands of classified documents smuggled secretly from the KGB headquaters in Yasenevo, by a senior KGB archivist, Vasili Mitrokhin) It contains loads of super-secret information about how the KGB recruited people from around the world (including people in the military, press and other high goverment ministers and Presidents & Prime Ministers) to work in the interest of the Soviet Union... just read this chapter .. (i have really put a lot of effort scanning the whole chapter and then correcting mistakes made by OCR... ) .. please read the whole thing....

Excerpt from “THE MITROKHIN ARCHIVE II”, 2004
Chapter 19 - Pakistan and Bangladesh

The Soviet Union's special relationship with India drastically limited its influence in Pakistan. Gromyko complained of 'the insidious [Western] web into which Pakistan fell almost at the outset of her existence as an independent state'.1 The KGB also found the authoritarian military regimes which governed Pakistan for most of the Cold War more difficult to penetrate than India's ruling Congress Party. The Communist Party of Pakistan, officially banned in 1951, was of much less significance than its large and influential Indian counterpart. According to KGB files, about twenty leading Karachi and Hyderabad Communists set up a small underground party with the cover name 'Sindh Provincial Committee' (SPC) which maintained secret contact with the KGB Karachi residency.2 The SPC was kept going by an annual Soviet subsidy delivered by the KGB which by
the mid-1970s amounted to $25-30,000.3 Another small Communist underground in East Pakistan also received covert funding.4 In addition, a number of SPC leaders made what the KGB considered handsome profits from privileged trading contracts with the Soviet Union.5 Moscow, however, had realistically low expectations of the SPC which, it believed, tended to exaggerate its support.6

Despite the KGB's apparent inability to penetrate the entourage of Pakistan's first military ruler, Ayub Khan (1958-69), it was well informed on his foreign policy, chiefly as a result of a series of agents in the Pakistani Foreign Ministry and Diplomatic Corps: among them GNOM, KURI, GREM and GULYAM. For seven years GNOM ('Gnome') provided both ciphered and deciphered diplomatic cables which he was taught to photograph with a miniature camera. He was recruited in 1960 under a 'false flag' by an English-speaking Russian KGB agent posing as the representative of a US publishing company who claimed to be collecting material for a book on international relations. In 1965 he was finally told (though he may well have realized this much earlier) that he was working for a foreign intelligence agency and signed a document acknowledging that he had received a monthly salary from it for the past five years. When GNOM returned to Pakistan in 1967 after a series of foreign postings, however, he broke contact with his controller.7 Like GNOM, the cipher clerk KURI was recruited under a false flag. In 1961 the KGB agent SAED, claiming to represent a large Pakistani company, persuaded KURI to supply Foreign Ministry documents on the pretext that these would help its commercial success in foreign markets. Again like GNOM, KURI probably realized subsequently that he was working for the KGB but continued to provide cipher material and other 'valuable documents' from both Pakistani embassies (including Washington) and the Foreign Ministry at least until the 1970s. His file also notes that he became 'very demanding' - presumably as regards the payment which he expected for his material.8

The most senior Pakistani diplomat identified in the files noted by Mitrokhin was GREM, who was recruited in 1965 and later became an ambassador. He is said to have provided 'valuable information'. The fact that, when he became ambassador, his controller was the
local KGB resident is a further indication of his importance.9 The only KGB agent in the Foreign Ministry whose identity can be revealed is Abu Sayid Hasan (codenamed GULYAM) who was
recruited in 1966. At the time of, or soon after, his recruitment, he worked in the Soviet section of the Ministry. During the 1970s he worked successively as Third Secretary in the High Commission in Bombay, Second Secretary in Saudi Arabia and section chief in the Ministry Administration Department. In 1979, a year before his death, he moved to the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport.10
As a result of the KGB's multiple penetrations of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry and embassies abroad, the codebreakers of the Eighth, and later the Sixteenth, Directorate were almost certainly
able to decrypt substantial amounts of Pakistan's diplomatic traffic.11 Thanks in part to the recruitment of ALI, who held a senior position in the military communications centre in Rawalpindi, Soviet codebreakers were probably also able to decrypt some of the traffic
of the Pakistani high command. ALI was recruited under false flag in 1965 by G. M. Yevsafyev, a KGB operations officer masquerading as a German radio engineer working for a West German company, and provided details of the high command's cipher machines. He later noticed the diplomatic number plates on Yevsafyev's car and realized that he was working for the KGB. The fact that a decade later ALI was still working as a Soviet agent, with the Karachi resident, S. S. Budnik, as his controller indicates the importance attached to his intelligence.12

The main purpose of KGB active measures in Pakistan both during and after the Ayub Khan era was to spread suspicion of the United States. At the outbreak of Pakistan's short and disastrous war with India over Kashmir in September 1965, the United States suspended military assistance to it. The KGB set out to exploit the bitterness felt at the American abandonment of Pakistan in its hour of need. The main target of its influence operations was Ayub Khan's flamboyant Foreign Minister, Zulfikar All Bhutto. Four years earlier, Bhutto, then Minister for Natural Resources, had invited the Soviet ambassador, Mikhail Stepanovich Kapitsa, and his wife to visit his family estate. With the Kapitsas, to act as translator, went a young Urdu-speaking diplomat, Leonid Shebarshin, who three years later was to transfer to the KGB. Bhutto made clear that he saw himself as a future foreign minister and that his ultimate ambition (also realized) was to become Prime Minister and President. Shebarshin found Bhutto's conversation 'desperately bold and even reckless'. He appeared obsessed with ending American influence in Pakistan and wanted Soviet assistance in achieving this.13 Operation REBUS in the spring of 1966 was principally designed to reinforce Bhutto's hostility to the United States by passing to the Pakistani government forged documents produced by Service A which purported to show that the US ambassador, Walter McConaughy, was plotting the overthrow of Ayub Khan, Bhutto and other ministers.14 The operation seems to have had some effect, at least on Bhutto, who was convinced for the rest of his life that his removal from office in June
1966 was the result of American pressure.15

Operation REBUS was followed in July 1966 by operation SPIDER, an active measure designed to convince Ayub Khan that the United States was using the West German Tarantel press agency
to attack his government and its close links with China. A bogus agency report including an insulting anti-Ayub cartoon, prepared by Service A on genuine Tarantel office stationery, was posted by the Karachi residency to newspapers and opposition figures. To ensure that it came to the authorities' attention, Service A also prepared forged letters supposedly written by outraged Pakistanis to the police chiefs in Lahore and Karachi, enclosing copies of the agency report. The bogus letter from Lahore claimed that two named members of the US Information Service were distributing the Tarantel material. The covering letter sent with the Service A forgeries to the Karachi residency on 9 June by the head of the South Asian Department, V. I. Startsev (unusually copied in its entirety by Mitrokhin), serves as an illustration both of the remarkably detailed
instructions sent to residencies involved in active measures, even including repeated reminders to affix the correct postage, and of the Centre's high expectations of what such operations were likely to achieve:

We hope that the two [forged] letters from well-wishers enclosing the Tarantel Press Agency information will serve as further proof to Pakistani counter-intelligence that the Americans are using this agency to spread anti-government material in the country. In order that operation SPIDER may be completed, you are requested to carry out the following operations:

1 Packet no. 1 contains envelopes containing Tarantel press agency material. They are to be sent to addresses of interest to us [newspapers and opposition figures]. You must stick on stamps of the correct value and post them in various post boxes in Karachi. This is to be done on July 21 or 22. this year. We are presuming that some of these addresses are watched by the police. We took most of them from the list of addresses used by the Tarantel press agency.

2 Packet no. 2 contains a letter from a well-wisher to the police headquarters in Karachi. You must stick a stamp of the correct value on the envelope and post it on July 23 this year.

3 Packet no. 3 contains a letter from a well-wisher to the police headquarters in Lahore. You must stick a stamp of the right value on this envelope too and post it in Lahore on August 2 or August 3 this year. We chose this date so that you would have time to arrange a trip to Lahore.

All these requests must be carried out, of course, with the utmost care and secrecy as otherwise the action could be turned against us. I would like you to inform us when the SPIDER actions have been carried out. We would also like you to observe the reactions of the Pakistani authorities to this
action and to inform us accordingly. We consider it possible that the Pakistani government may make a protest to the West German embassy that anti-government material is being distributed by Tarantel press agency or that it might take some kind of action against the USA. The Pakistanis
might even expel the Americans mentioned in our material. The local authorities might resort to organizing some kind of action against American institutions, such as demonstrations, disturbances, fires, explosions etc. For your personal information we are sending the texts of the SPIDER material in Russian and English in Packet no. 4. After reading them, we request you to destroy them.16

What effect, if any, operation SPIDER had on the Ayub Khan regime remains unknown. The Centre's hope that Pakistani authorities might bomb American buildings in revenge for US involvement in the circulation of 'anti-government material' was, however, based on little more than wishful thinking.

While operations REBUS and SPIDER were in full swing, the Karachi residency was in turmoil as a result of the appointment at the beginning of the year of a new and incompetent resident,
codenamed ANTON, a veteran of the South Asian section. ANTON was one of those intelligence officers with severe drinking problems who were deployed by the FCD from time to time in Third
World countries. According to Shebarshin, who had the misfortune to serve under him, he appeared not to have read a book for years, 'was incapable of focusing on an idea, appraising information, or
formulating an assignment in a literate manner'. He was also frequently drunk and persistently foul-mouthed. Residency officers tried to avoid him. ANTON's one redeeming feature, in Shebarshin's view, was that he rarely interfered in their work. Eventually, after he collapsed at an embassy reception, the Soviet ambassador, M. V. Degtiar, insisted on his recall to Moscow. To the dismay
of Shebarshin and his colleagues, however, ANTON continued working in the FCD. Within the often heavy-drinking culture of the Centre, alcoholism rarely led to dismissal.17

Late in 1967 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took the initiative in founding the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) under the populist slogan, 'Islam is our faith, democracy is our polity, socialism is our economic
policy; all power to the people.' 'To put it in one sentence', declared one of the PPP's founding documents, 'the aim of the Party is the transformation of Pakistan into a socialist society.'18 During the winter of 1968-69, the PPP under Bhutto's charismatic leadership coordinated a wave of popular protest which in March 1969 finally persuaded Ayub Khan to surrender power. He did so, however, not, as the 1962. constitution required, to the Speaker of the Assembly but to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, General Yahya Khan, who promptly abrogated the constitution and declared martial law.19

The Centre immediately embarked on a series of active measures designed to make Yahya Khan suspicious of both China and the United States. Operation RAVI was based on two Service A
forgeries: a 'Directive' dated 3 June 1969 supposedly sent from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Chinese charge d'affaires in India and a Chinese Foreign Ministry document outlining plans to turn Kashmir into a pro-Chinese independent state. On 28 June copies of both forgeries were sent to the Pakistani ambassadors in Delhi and Washington, doubtless in the hope that their contents would be reported to Yahya Khan.20 Simultaneously, another active-measures operation, codenamed ZUBR, spread reports that Americans had lost faith in Yahya Khan's ability to hold on to power and were afraid that he would be replaced by a left-wing government which would nationalize the banks and confiscate their deposits. The United States embassy was said to have reported to Washington that Yahya Khan's regime was hopelessly
corrupt and would squander any foreign aid given to it. The Karachi residency also claimed the credit for organizing a demonstration against the Vietnam War.21

After RAVI and ZUBR came operation PADMA, which was designed to persuade the Yahya Khan regime that the Chinese were inciting rebellion in East Pakistan. Service A fabricated a Chinese
appeal to 'Bengali revolutionaries', urging them to take up arms against 'the Punjabi landowners and the reactionary regime of Yahya Khan'. The original intention was to write the appeal in Bengali but, since no KGB officer was sufficiently fluent in the language and the operation was considered too sensitive to entrust to a Bengali agent, it was written in English. A copy was posted to the Indian ambassador in November 1969 in the knowledge that it would be opened by Pakistani intelligence before arrival and thus come to the knowledge of the Pakistani authorities. A further copy was sent to the US ambassador in the hope that he too would personally bring it to the
attention of the Pakistanis. Simultaneously, KGB agents in Kabul warned Pakistani diplomats of Chinese subversion in East Pakistan. The Pakistani representative in the UN was reported to be taking similar reports seriously. A post-mortem on PADMA concluded that the operation had been a success. The supposed Chinese appeal to Bengali revolutionaries was said to have become common knowledge among foreign diplomats in Pakistan. The Centre concluded that even the Americans did not suspect that the appeal was a KGB fabrication.22

New entrants to the FCD South Asian Department were often told that, when shown a map of the divided Pakistani state after the partition of India in 1947, Stalin had commented, 'Such a state
cannot survive for long.’23 By the late i96os the Kremlin seems to have come to the conclusion that the separation of Pakistan's western and eastern wings would be in Soviet, as well as Indian,
interests.24 The KGB therefore set out to cultivate the leader of the autonomist Awami League, Sheik Mujibur Rahman ('Mujib'). Though Mujib was unaware of the cultivation, the KGB claimed
that it succeeded in persuading him that the United States had been responsible for his arrest in January 1968, when he had been charged with leading the so-called 'Agartala conspiracy', hatched during meetings with Indian officials at the border town of Agartala to bring about the secession of East Pakistan with Indian help. Through an intermediary, Mujib was told in September 1969 that the names of all the conspirators had been personally passed to Ayub by the US ambassador. According to a KGB report, Mujib was completely taken in by the disinformation and concluded that there must have been a leak to the Americans from someone in his entourage.25

Late in 1969 Yahya Khan announced that, though martial law remained in force, party politics would be allowed to resume on i January 1970 in preparation for elections at the end of the year.
The Centre's main strategy during the election campaign was to ensure the victory of Bhutto's PPP in the West and Mujib's Awami League in the East.26 In June 1970 V. I. Startsev, head of the FCD
South Asian Department, jointly devised with N. A. Kosov, the head of Service A, an elaborate active-measures campaign designed to discredit all the main opponents of the PPP and Awami League. The President of the Qaiyum Muslim League, Abdul Qaiyum Khan, who had been Chief Minister from 1947 to 1953, was to be discredited by speeches he had allegedly made before 1947 opposing the creation of an independent Pakistan. The founder and leader of the religious party, Jamaat-i-Islami, Maulana Syed Abul Ala Maudidi, was to be exposed as a 'reactionary and CIA agent'. The head of the Council Muslim League, Mian Mumtaz Daultana, was to be unmasked as a
veteran British agent (presumably because of his past residence in London) and accomplice in political murders. The leader of the Convention Muslim League, Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry, was also to be implicated in past political murders as well as in plans to murder Bhutto. (Ironically, in 1973 he became President of Pakistan with Bhutto's backing.) The President of the Pakistan Democratic Party, Nurul Amin, in order to discredit him in West Pakistan, was to be unmasked as a leading figure in the 'Agartala conspiracy'.27

Though the elections of December 1970 produced the result for which the KGB had covertly campaigned, there is no evidence that active measures had any significant impact on the outcome. It would, however, have been out of character if the Centre had failed to claim substantial credit when reporting on the election to the Politburo. The PPP won 81 of the 138 seats allocated to West Pakistan; the runner-up in the West, the Qaiyum Muslim League, won only nine seats. In the East, the Awami League won an even more sweeping victory with 160 of the 162 seats. Though Mujib had failed to contest a single seat in West Pakistan, he thus won an overall majority in the National Assembly and was entitled to become Prime Minister. Bhutto colluded with Ayub and the army in refusing to allow Mujib to take power. On 25 March 1971 Yahya Khan ordered Mujib's arrest and began savage military repression in East Pakistan. The Centre reported to the Central Committee that the end of Pakistani unity was imminent.28 While Bhutto naively - or cynically - declared,
'Pakistan has been saved', Bengal was overwhelmed by a bloodbath which compared in its savagery with the intercommunal butchery which had followed Indian independence in 1947. India provided a safe haven for Bengali troops resisting the Pakistani army. In November the civil war between East and West Pakistan turned into an Indo-Pakistani war. On 16 December Dhaka fell to Indian troops and East Pakistan became independent Bangladesh.

The political transformation of the Indian subcontinent caused by the divorce between East and West Pakistan suited Moscow's interests. The Indo-Soviet special relationship had been enhanced
and Indira ****hi's personal prestige raised to an all-time high. Pakistan had been dramatically weakened by the independence of Bangladesh. Moscow's preferred candidates (given the impossibility of Communist regimes) took power in both Islamabad and Dhaka. After defeat by India, Yahya Khan resigned and handed over the presidency to Bhutto. On 10 January 1972, Mujib returned from captivity in West Pakistan to a hero's welcome in Dhaka.

Despite the fact that Bhutto nationalized over thirty large firms in ten basic industries in January 1972 and visited Moscow in March, the Kremlin had far more reservations about him (initially as President, then, after the 1973 elections, as Prime Minister) than about Mujib. The most constant element in Bhutto's erratic foreign policy was friendship with China, which he visited almost as soon as he succeeded Yahya Khan. At his request, China vetoed Bangladesh's admission to the United Nations until it had repatriated all Pakistani personnel captured after the war (some of whom it was considering putting on trial for war crimes). China also helped to set up Pakistan's first heavy engineering plants as well as supplying arms.

Somewhat incongruously in view of his largely Western lifestyle, Bhutto took to imitating Mao Zedong's clothes and cap. In 1976 he even had a book of his own sayings published in the various languages spoken in Pakistan, much in the manner of Mao's Little Red Book.29 Mildly absurd though Bhutto's neo-Maoist affectations were, Moscow was not amused. As one of Bhutto's advisers, Rafi Raza, later acknowledged: 'The lack of importance attached by the Soviet Union to ZAB[hutto] was evidenced by the fact that no significant Soviet dignitary visited Pakistan during his five and a half years in government, despite his own two visits [to Moscow] . . .'30

So far as Moscow was concerned, Mujib's relations with China, in contrast to Bhutto's, were reassuringly poor. Bangladesh and China did not establish diplomatic relations until after Mujib's
death. As in India and Pakistan, the KGB was able to exploit the corruption of newly independent Bangladesh. For politicians, bureaucrats and the military there were numerous opportunities to
cream off a percentage of the foreign aid which flooded into the country.31 Mujib once asked despairingly: 'Who takes bribes? Who indulges in smuggling? Who becomes a foreign agent? Who transfers money abroad? Who resorts to hoarding? It's being done by us -the five per cent of the people who are educated. We are the bribe takers, the corrupt elements . . .'32

Though overwhelmingly the most popular person in Bangladesh, Mujib was in some ways curiously isolated. Irritated by the personality conflicts within the Awami League, he increasingly saw himself as the sole personification of Bangladesh - the Bangabandbu. He was, it has been rightly observed, 'a fine Bangabandbu but a poor prime minister'.33 The Dhaka residency acknowledged in its annual report for 1972,, after Bangladesh's first year of independence, that it had failed to recruit any agent close to Mujib.34 Among its successes during that year, however, was the recruitment of three agents in the Directorate of National Security (codenamed KOMBINAT).35 The KGB also succeeded in gaining control of one daily newspaper (to which it paid the equivalent of 300,000 convertible rubles to purchase new printing presses) and one weekly.36 On 2. February 1973 the Politburo instructed the KGB to use active measures to influence the outcome of Bangladesh's forthcoming first parliamentary elections.37 The KGB helped to fund the election campaigns of Mujib's Awami League as well as its allies, the Communist Party and the left-wing National Awami Party. Probably with little justification, it claimed part of the credit for the predictable landslide victory of the Awami League.38

In June 1975, doubtless to the delight of Moscow, Mujib transformed Bangladesh into a one-party state whose new ruling party, BAKSAL, incorporated the three parties hitherto secretly subsidized by the KGB (Awami League, National Awami Party and Communist Party) and one other left-wing party.39 By this time the Dhaka residency had recruited a senior member of Mujib's secretariat, MITRA, two ministers, SALTAN and KALIF, and two senior intelligence officers, MAKHIR and SHEF. All were used against US targets.40
The FCD's analytical department. Service 1, had forecast after the 1973 elections that the Awami League would retain power for the full five-year term and that the main opposition to it would come from the pro-Chinese left (always a bete noire of the KGB). A series of Service A forgeries were used in an attempt to persuade both Mujib and the Bangladeshi media that the Chinese were conspiring with the left-wing opposition.41 The real threat to Mujib, however, came not from Maoists but from his opponents within the armed forces. On 15 August 1975 a group of army officers murdered both him and much of his family. The KGB immediately began an active-measures campaign, predictably inspiring newspaper articles in a series of countries claiming that the coup was the work of the CIA.42 Within twenty-four hours of Mujib's murder, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became the first to recognize the new military regime -deluding himself into believing that Bangladesh might now be willing to form a federation with Pakistan. Bhutto was later to repent of his early enthusiasm as it became clear that Bangladesh's links with New Delhi would remain far closer than those with Islamabad. It also dawned upon him that the coup in Bangladesh might set a bad example to the Pakistani military - as indeed it did.43

During the mid-1970s the KGB substantially increased its influence in the Pakistani media. In 1973, according to KGB statistics, it placed thirty-three articles in the Pakistani press - little more than 1 per cent of the number in India.44 By 1977 the number had risen to 440,45 and the KGB had acquired direct control of at least one periodical.46 The main aim of active-measures operations was, once again, to increase Pakistani distrust of the United States. Disinformation fed to Bhutto's government claimed that the United States considered Pakistan too unreliable an ally to deserve substantial military aid. Washington was, allegedly, increasingly distrustful of Bhutto's government and regarded the Shah of Iran as its main regional ally. The Shah was said to be determined to become the leader of the Muslim world and to regard Bhutto as a rival. He was also reported to be scornful of Bhutto's failure to deal with unrest in Baluchistan and to be willing to send in Iranian troops if the situation worsened.47

By 1975 the KGB was confident that active measures were having a direct personal influence on Bhutto.48 On 16 November the Soviet ambassador informed him that, in view of 'the friendly and neigh¬bourly relations between our two countries', he had been instructed to warn him that the Soviet authorities had information that a terrorist group was planning to assassinate him during his forthcoming visit to Baluchistan. Bhutto was profuse in his thanks for the ambassador's disinformation:
I was planning to fly to Baluchistan tonight or tomorrow morning for a few days. I shall now cancel the visit to get to the bottom of this matter in order not to put my life at risk. I am particularly conscious of the genuine and friendly relations between our countries at this difficult stage in the political life of Pakistan which is also difficult for me personally. I am doubly grateful to your country and its leaders.49
The KGB reported that Bhutto had also been successfully deceived by disinformation claiming that Iran was planning to detach Baluchistan from Pakistan and had stated as fact supposed Iranian plans to destabilize Pakistan which, in reality, had been fabricated by Service A.50 Agent DVIN was reported to have direct access to Bhutto to feed him further fabrications.51
Despite Bhutto's susceptibility to Soviet disinformation, however, Moscow continued to regard him as a loose cannon. As one of Bhutto's ministers and closest advisers, Rafi Raza, later acknow¬ledged, 'Neither superpower considered him reliable.' Among the initiatives by Bhutto which annoyed the Kremlin was his campaign for a 'new economic world order ... to redress the grave injustice to the poorer nations of the world'. Kept out of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) by what amounted to an Indian veto, Bhutto appeared to challenge its authority. On the eve of the NAM summit in Colombo in August 1976, Bhutto published an article entitled 'Third World - New Direction', calling for a Third World summit in Islamabad in the spring of 1976 to discuss global economic reform.52 The Centre feared that, by bringing in non-NAM members under Bhutto's chairmanship, such a summit would damage the prestige of the NAM, which it regarded as an important vehicle for KGB active measures. Following a Politburo resolution condemning Bhutto's proposal,53 the Centre devised an active-measures operation of almost global dimensions. KGB agents were to inform the current Chair of the NAM, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, and other Sri Lankan politicians that Bhutto's aim was to undermine her personal authority as well as to divide NAM members and weaken the move¬ment's commitment to anti-imperialism. Disinformation prepared by Service A designed to discredit Bhutto's initiative was to be forwarded by the local KGB residencies to the governments of Somalia, Nigeria, Ghana, Cyprus, Yemen, Mexico, Venezuela, Iraq, Afghanistan and Nepal. The Centre was also confident that its active measures would persuade President Boumedienne of Algeria to spread the message that an Islamabad conference would weaken the NAM and diminish the influence of 'progressive' leaders in the movement. Delegates attending a NAM planning conference in Delhi were to be given statements by Indian groups prepared under KGB guidance condemning Bhutto's initiative as a threat to the unity of the NAM.54

In the event the Islamabad conference failed to materialize and on 5 July 1977 Bhutto was overthrown in a military coup led by the commander-in-chief of the army, General Zia ul-Haq. On 3 September Bhutto was charged with conspiracy to murder the father of a maverick PPP politician. By now, most of the popular enthusiasm which had swept him to power seven years earlier had been dissipated by his autocratic manner and the corruption of his regime. As one of his most fervent supporters noted in December, 'It was painful to see that while Bhutto stood trial for murder in Lahore, the people of the city were showing greater interest in the Test match being played there.'55 Bhutto was sentenced to death on 18 March 1978 following a trial of dubious legality and executed on 4 April 1979 after the sentence had been narrowly upheld by the Supreme Court. KGB active measures predictably blamed Bhutto's overthrow and execution, like that of Mujib, on a CIA conspiracy.56
Neither General Ziaur Rahman (better known as Zia), who by the end of 1976 had emerged as the dominant figure in Bangladesh (initially as Chief Martial Law Administrator and from 1977 as President), nor Zia ul-Haq (also, confusingly, better known as Zia) was favourably regarded in the Kremlin. Both, in the Centre's view, were far better disposed to Washington than to Moscow. One of Ziaur Rahman's first actions was to change the constitution by replacing 'socialism' as a principle of state with a vaguer commitment to 'economic justice and equality'. His economic policy was based on encouraging the private sector and privatizing public enterprise. The increased foreign aid desperately needed by Bangladesh, Zia believed, could only be obtained by moving closer to the West (especially the United States), the Muslim world and China. Moscow was visibly affronted. Izvestia complained in 1977 that right-wing and Maoist forces in Bangladesh were conducting a campaign of 'provocation and vilification against the Soviet Union'.57 The KGB claimed the credit for organizing a series of protest demonstrations in September and October 1978 against an agreement signed by the Zia regime with Washington permitting the US Peace Corps to operate in Bangladesh.58

According to KGB statistics, active measures in Bangladesh increased from ninety in 1978 to about 200 in 1979, and involved twenty agents of influence. The KGB claimed that in 1979 it planted 101 articles in the press, organized forty-four meetings to publicize disinformation and on twenty-six occasions arranged for Service A forgeries to reach the Bangladesh authorities.59 The dominant theme of the forgeries was CIA conspiracy against the Ziaur Rahman regime. Operation ARSENAL in 1978 brought to the attention of the Directorate of National Security the supposed plotting of a CIA officer (real or alleged) named Young with opposition groups.60 Service A drew some of the inspiration for its forgeries from real plots by the President's Bangladeshi opponents. During Zia's five and a half years in power he had to deal with at least seventeen mutinies and attempted coups. In August 1979, for example, a group of officers were arrested in Dhaka and accused of plotting to overthrow him. Two months later Andropov approved an FCD proposal for Service A to fabricate a letter supporting the plotters from Air Vice-Marshal Muhammad Ghulam Tawab, whom Zia had sacked as head of the air force. Other material planted in the Bangladeshi, Indian and Sri Lankan press purported to unmask Tawab as a long-standing CIA agent.61 Service A also forged a letter from a CIA officer in Dhaka to the former Deputy Prime Minister, Moudud Ahmad, assuring him of US support for the right-wing opposition to Zia.62 In 1981 another disinformation operation pur¬ported to show that the Reagan administration was plotting Zia's overthrow and had established secret contact with Khondakar Mustaque Ahmad, who had briefly become President after the assassina¬tion of Mujib and had been imprisoned by Zia from 1976 to i98o.63 There is no evidence that KGB active measures had any success in undermining the Zia regime. At the 1979 general election, which was generally considered to have been fairly conducted, Zia's Bangladesh National Party won 207 of the 300 seats. Zia, however, never succeeded in resolving the problems posed by unrest in the armed forces. After several narrow escapes, he was assassinated while on a visit to Chittagong during an attempted coup led by the local army commander on 29 May 1981.64

Whatever successes were achieved by active-measures campaigns in Pakistan and Bangladesh during the late 1970s were more than cancelled out by the hostile reaction in both countries to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the brutal war which followed. Hitherto Zia ul-Haq had been widely under¬estimated in both West and East. In the summer of 1978 The Economist had dismissed him as a 'well-intentioned but increasingly maladroit military ruler', while the Guardian declared that, 'Zia's name has a death-rattle sound these days. There's a feeling he can't last much longer.' Once war began in Afghanistan, however, it seemed to Zia ul-Haq's chief of army staff, General Khalid Mahmud Arif, that:

All eyes were focused on Pakistan. Would she buckle under pressure and acquiesce in superpower aggression? The Western countries quickly changed their tune. The arch critics of the autocratic military ruler of Pakistan began to woo him. They suddenly discovered Zia's hitherto unknown 'sterling qualities' and the special importance of Pakistan in the changed circumstances.65
Zia began pressing the Carter administration to provide arms and assistance to the mujahideen insurgents against the Communist regime in Afghanistan even before the Soviet invasion. The Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) made similar approaches to the CIA. In February 1980 President Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, visited Pakistan to agree with Zia US covert assistance to the Afghan mujahideen across the Pakistan border.66 The meeting between Zia and Brzezinski inaugurated what was in effect a secret US-Pakistani alliance for covert intervention in Afghanistan which lasted for the remainder of the war. The KGB almost certainly deduced, even if they did not obtain detailed intelligence on, the purpose of Brzezinski's visit. After Brzezinski's departure from Islamabad, Gromyko declared that Pakistan was putting its own security at risk by acting as a 'springboard for further aggression against Afghanistan'.67

Andropov simultaneously approved an elaborate series of active measures designed to deter Zia from providing, or allowing the Americans or Chinese to provide, assistance to the mujahideen. The head of the Pakistani intelligence station in Moscow was to be privately warned that if Pakistan was used as a base for 'armed struggle against Afghanistan', the Oriental Institute (then headed by Yevgeni Primakov) would be asked to devise ways of assisting Baluchi and Pushtun separatist movements on the North-West Frontier in order to seal off the Afghan border.68 The CIA concluded that there was a serious 'possibility of large-scale Soviet aid to the Baluchi'.69 KGB active measures also sought to persuade Zia that some of his own senior officers, who opposed his Afghan policy, were plotting against him. Service A prepared leaflets in English and Urdu on Pakistani paper purporting to come from a secret oppo¬sition group to Zia within the Pakistani army. On the night of 28 February to i March 1980 KGB officers drove round Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Karachi distributing copies of the leaflets from a device attached to their cars. According to a KGB report, the leaflets were taken seriously by Pakistani security, which began an immediate investigation and wrongly incriminated the deputy army chief-of-staff, Lieutenant-General Muhammad Iqbal Khan (remembered by a British diplomat who knew him well as 'a decent and straightforward man'). The KGB claimed that this investigation provoked an unsuccessful coup by Iqbal Khan on 5 March, which led in turn to the removal or retirement of a series of senior officers and to the expul¬sion of two members of the US consulate in Lahore who had been in contact with them. On 25 March Andropov was informed that operation SARDAR had led the Zia regime to believe that the United States was conspiring with dissidents in the Pakistani army. Andropov approved the continuation of the operation. Several similar leaflets were distributed over the next year.70
Letters fabricated by Service A in the names of various informants and bogus conspirators were sent to American organizations and other addresses in Pakistan whose mail was believed to be intercepted by the local security services, as well as to the Pakistani ambassador in Washington, in order to spread the fiction of a CIA plot to overthrow the Zia regime. Disinformation planted on the Pakistani ambassador in Bangkok reported that the State Department regarded the regime as an unpopular, incompetent dictatorship which should be replaced as soon as possible.71 Another active-measures operation sought to persuade the Pakistani authorities that the CIA was plotting with separatists in Baluchistan, promising to support their campaign for autonomy in return for help in conducting covert cross-border operations against the Khomeini regime. Among the more ingenious fabrications devised by Service A as part of this operation was a wallet containing a compromising document allegedly lost by a CIA officer operating under diplomatic cover. The wallet, supposedly found by a member of the Pakistani public, was handed in at a police station to ensure that it came to the attention of the authorities.72 Simultaneously, the KGB orchestrated a large-scale campaign in the Pakistani and foreign press attacking Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan.73 During the first eight months of the war the KGB claimed to have planted 527 articles in Pakistani newspapers.74

The Centre also went to elaborate lengths to exacerbate popular resentment against the Afghan refugees flooding across the border by planting agents in their midst with a mission to discredit them.75 Its active measures, however, had no effect on Zia's policy. The Afghan refugee camps quickly became recruitment centres for the mujahideen. The ISI channelled the recruits into seven Islamic resistance groups, all with bases in Pakistan which directed operations across the Afghan border. The Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party) led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the most important of the fundamentalist mujahideen groups, had particularly close links with the Zia ul-Haq regime. In 1978, in an attempt to bolster support for the regime, Zia had taken five members of the Pakistani wing of Hizb-i-Islami into his government. With Zia's support, the ISI replaced the Foreign Ministry as the main policy-making body on Afghanistan.76
Zia ul-Haq was well aware, even if he did not know many of the details, that the KGB was conducting a major active-measures offensive against him. Though the details remain classified, from an early stage in the war he received intelligence from the CIA as well as from his own agencies.77 His response to the KGB offensive appears to have taken the Centre by surprise. In August and September 1980 Pakistan carried out the biggest expulsion of Soviet intelligence and other personnel since Britain had excluded 105 KGB and GRU officers in 1971.78 Kryuchkov reacted to the expulsion and the problems created by the dramatic reduction in the size of the Pakistani residencies by setting up an interdepartmental working group within the FCD chaired by one of his deputies, V. A. Chukhrov, to try to devise ways of working with Pakistani opposition forces to destabilize and eventually overthrow the Zia regime.79

The most violent of Zia's opponents was Murtaza Bhutto, elder son of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who founded a small terrorist group, initially claiming to be the armed wing of the PPP, to avenge his father's death. While in jail, Bhutto senior had famously remarked, 'My sons are not my sons if they do not drink the blood of those who dare shed my blood today.'80 In May 1979, a month after his father's execution, Murtaza visited Kabul to seek the help of the Taraki government in setting up a base in Afghanistan from which his guerrillas could launch attacks against the Zia regime.81 Murtaza was allowed to receive a large arms shipment from Yasir Arafat and to house a small band of apprentice guerrillas, his so-called 'revolutionary army', in a derelict building which the volunteers called 'Dracula House'. His first attempt to smuggle some of his arms cache into Pakistan ended in disaster when the man chosen to take them across the border turned out to be a Pakistani agent. Murtaza was reduced to scouring Pakistani newspapers and claiming to his Afghan hosts that accidents and fires reported in them were the work of his guerrillas. After the Soviet invasion, however, Murtaza established a close relationship with Muhammad Najibullah, head of KHAD, the newly founded Afghan intelligence service, who as a goodwill gesture paid the costs of Murtaza's wedding to a young Afghan woman.82
Murtaza and Najibullah had a series of discussions on joint covert operations against Pakistan.83 Since KHAD was operating under KGB direction, there is no doubt that their discussions were fully approved by the Centre.84 Given the risks of operating with the volatile Murtaza, however, the Centre preferred to deal with him at one remove through KHAD. Murtaza may never have realized that, in his dealings with him, KHAD was acting as a KGB surrogate.85 His first successful operations inside Pakistan, agreed with Najibul¬lah, were a bomb attack on the Sindh high court and the destruction of a Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) DC-10 aircraft at Karachi airport in January 1981. He also planned to disrupt the visit of Pope John Paul II to Pakistan in February by exploding a bomb during the pontiff's address in a Karachi stadium. But the bomb went off prematurely at the entrance to the stadium, killing the bomber and a policeman.86
In December Murtaza Bhutto and Najibullah decided on what was to be their most spectacular joint operation, codenamed ALAMGIR ('Swordbearer') by the KGB.87 It was agreed that Murtaza's guerrillas would hijack a PIA airliner over Pakistan and divert it to Damascus or Tripoli. The three novice hijackers who boarded a plane at Karachi on 2 March 1981, however, made the mistake of choosing an internal flight which had insufficient fuel to reach Damascus or Tripoli. The leading hijacker, Salamullah Tipu, ordered the pilot to land at Kabul instead. As the plane landed, Tipu informed the control tower that he was a member of the armed wing of the PPP, which was fighting for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan, and wished to speak to 'Dr Salahuddin', Murtaza's codename in Kabul. Murtaza, who chose the occasion to rename his terrorist group Al-Zulfikar ('The Sword'), came to meet Tipu at the bottom of the .aircraft steps88 and was joined by Najibullah, who was dis¬guised in the clothes of an airport worker. Both the KGB mission and the Kabul residency advised Najibullah on the best methods of using the hijack to discredit the Zia regime.89 On 4 March Anahita Ratebzad, President of the Afghan-Soviet Friendship Association and Minister of Education, who was a 'confidential contact' of the KGB,90 came to the airport surrounded by TV cameras, to express support for the 'just demands' of the hijackers and to ask for the release of the women and children on the aircraft to mark Inter¬national Women's Day. In a pre-arranged gesture, Tipu announced that he was happy to accede to Ratebzad's request. On 5 March the Afghan leader and long-standing KGB agent, Babrak Karmal, who had just returned from Moscow, conducted a live televised phone conversation with Tipu from the control tower. Like Ratebzad, Karmal gave strong backing to the hijackers' 'just demands'. Tipu replied in an emotional voice that Karmal was the greatest man in the whole of Asia.91
Among the hijackers' demands was the release of over fifty 'political prisoners' from Pakistani jails. When Zia refused, one of the passengers was beaten, shot and thrown onto the tarmac, where he writhed in agony as he lay dying. The victim, Tariq Rahim, was a devoted former ADC to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, but the paranoid tendencies of both Tipu and Murtaza convinced them that Rahim had really been in league with Zia.92 This gruesome episode may well have persuaded the KGB that it was time for the aircraft to move on. Before the plane was refuelled for a flight to Syria, then the Soviet Union's closest major ally in the Middle East, further arms were taken on board unseen by the TV cameras. The three hijackers, who had arrived in Kabul armed only with pistols, left equipped with Kalashnikovs, grenades, explosives, a timing device and $4,500.93 After the aircraft landed in Damascus, Zia initially continued to refuse to release political prisoners but was eventually persuaded to do so by Washington in order to save the lives of American hostages on board. Murtaza hailed the freeing of fifty-four PPP members from Pakistani jails as a triumph for Al-Zulfikar. KHAD and the KGB appeared to agree. Al-Zulfikar's base was moved from the derelict 'Dracula House' to new palatial head¬quarters, which received a steady stream of refugees from Zia's regime anxious to become guerrillas and fight for its overthrow.94
As well as supporting Al-Zulfikar, KHAD was also used by the KGB to channel arms to separatist and dissident groups in the Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan and Sindh. At the end of 1980 the leader of a Baluchi separatist group based in Afghanistan had secret talks with Najibullah who promised to provide the separatists with arms, 400 military instructors and three training camps. After talks between another Baluchi leader and the Afghan President, Babrak Karmal, in April 1981, KHAD opened two more camps to train Baluchi guerrillas to fight the Pakistani and Iranian regimes.95

The huge influx of Afghan refugees in Pakistan (eventually numbering perhaps as many as 3.5 million) offered numerous opportunities for agent infiltration. Since the agents were usually Afghan, in most instances the KGB used KHAD as its surrogate. According to statistics in FCD files, acting as a KGB surrogate, in the early 1980s KHAD's foreign intelligence directorate had 107 agents and 115 'trainee' agents operating inside Pakistan, mostly within the Afghan refugee community.96 The FCD interdepartmental working group headed by Chukhrov made penetration of the mujahideen a major priority.97 Twenty-six KHAD agents were said to have access to the headquarters of the rival mujahideen groups; fifteen were members of the Pakistani armed forces, intelligence community and official bureaucracy.98 Their main achievement was to increase the existing tension and mistrust between the rival groups. Though this achievement did not change the course of the war in Afghanistan, it significantly diminished the effectiveness of mujahideen operations."
The Centre also attempted to disrupt the links between Zia and the mujahideen groups in Pakistan by active measures designed to brand him as a traitor to Islam. On 18 April 1981 Kryuchkov submitted to Andropov a new proposal for disinformation designed 'to cause a deterioration in Pakistani-Iranian relations and to exacerbate the political situation in Pakistan':
1 Using [Service A's] samples in the Centre, leaflets should be written in Urdu by a fictitious opposition group calling for the overthrow of the regime of Zia ul-Haq and an Islamic Revolution in Pakistan. A large number of the leaflets should be printed and distributed in Pakistan. The text of the leaflet must make it clear that the writers are under the strong influence of Khomeini. The leaflet should quote Khomeini's criticisms of Zia ul-Haq and the present regime in Pakistan. The leaflet should be distributed by the residencies in Islamabad and Karachi and by our Afghan friends.
2 The residencies in Bangladesh and India should get the press in these countries to publish articles about a powerful opposition organization in Pakistan which was set up by the Iranian special services and which is actively working to overthrow Zia ul-Haq. We await your approval.
Andropov gave his approval on 21 April.100 Service A's leaflets attacking Zia as a traitor to Islam (operation ZAKHIR) took several forms. Some, such as the following example (unusually copied in its entirety by Mitrokhin), were intended to appear to be the work of Shi'ite groups inspired by Khomeini's example:

In the name of Allah, merciful and kind! Glory to Allah who made us Muslims and said in his Holy book: ‘Is there anyone better than the man who calls on Allah to do good and says that he is obedient to him?' (S.4i, A.33) Blessed is the prophet, his family and associates.
Brothers in faith!
Our enemies are not only those who openly oppose Islam, but also those who, under the cover of Islamism, do their dirty deeds. For it is written:
'Do not be afraid of your enemies, but of the day when you turn your back on Islam and the mosques.'
Zia ul-Haq is a hypocrite like the former Shah of Iran. He also prayed with Muslims, went on a pilgrimage to the Holy places and knew how to talk about the Holy Quran.
We are calling on the army and the people to rise up against the despot Zia ul-Haq, the servant of Satan - the United States of America - and to prepare him for the fate of the Shah. Satan is frightened that the Islamic Revolution, started in Iran, will spread to Pakistan. This is why Satan is generously supplying Zia ul-Haq with arms with which to kill believers. Zia ul-Haq has flooded our country with various unbelieving Americans and impure Chinese who are teaching him how to kill pure Muslims. He believes in their advice more than in the teachings of Allah. Zia ul-Haq is a mercenary dog who is living on Satan's dollars. He has ordered Zia ul-Haq to establish a cruel and bloody regime and to crush the Muslim people who are now living with no rights.
At the same time corruption and hypocrisy are eating away at our society. Crime is increasing. The reason is not only a lack of true belief, but the increasing gap between the rich and poor. As All-powerful Allah teaches us: 'A man will only receive when he is zealous.' Our prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him, called on us Muslims to work honestly and hard in respect of the Almighty. This means that a Muslim must only receive what he has earned by his own labours. But Zia ul-Haq and his clique are unlawfully making themselves rich from other people's work. Even the Zekat [obligatory alms to the needy - one of the pillars of Islam] has become a thing of personal gain to them. Taking advantage of the fact that no one can control them, they award a large part of the Zekat. But the Most High ordered us that: 'Charity is for the poor and beggars, for the deliverance of slaves, for those in debt, for actions in the name of Islam and for travellers as declared by Allah. He is knowing and wise.' And our prophet Muhammad, and may He rest in peace, taught us that the Zekat must all be used for the needs of the poor, orphans and widows. Ask our poor people whether they have received much charity from the Zekat. Collecting the Zekat by force, Zia ul-Haq and his clique are not only insulting true Muslims. They are shamelessly ignoring the teachings of Islam. And they manage to hide their own money from the Zekat. All Muslims should know that Zia ul-Haq recently stole millions. He keeps his riches abroad as did the former Shah of Iran, knowing that sooner or later he will be forced to flee. He is hoping that Satan will protect him from the anger of the people. Meanwhile he is serving Satan faithfully by ensuring favourable conditions for the dominance of non-believers. He knows that this will lead to further theft from Muslims.
The clique of Zia ul-Haq has carried out a census of the population and its housing. This was also inspired by Satan as a way to introduce new taxes and labour conditions in contradiction of the teachings of Muhammad, may Allah bless him, for he said that anyone who oppresses a Muslim is not his follower.
Zia ul-Haq is leading the country to disaster. He wants to ride on the atomic devil and become a despot over all Muslims.
But Allah is great and just. Only dust remains from the enemies of Islam, but the warriors for the true faith are remembered for ever.
Everyone must join the fight in the name of Islam against the bloody dictator Zia ul-Haq.
Allah is great!101

Other Service A leaflets purported to come from dissident Islamic officers, condemning Zia as a hypocritical traitor who, while pro¬fessing friendship for Iran, was secretly plotting with the Americans to bring down the Islamic Republic. The Service A forgers threatened Zia with assassination. 'Next time', they told him, 'you will pay for it as Sadat did.'102

Murtaza Bhutto, meanwhile, with the assistance of Najibullah, acting as a KGB surrogate, was preparing a real plot to assassinate Zia. Though the evidence comes exclusively from former Al-Zulfikar sources, it appears that Zia narrowly escaped two assassination attempts early in i98z. The weapon in both cases was a Soviet SAM-7 (surface-to-air) missile. On the first occasion, in January, two Al-Zulfikar terrorists carried a SAM missile in the boot of a car to a deserted hillside in sight of Islamabad airport and awaited the arrival of a Falcon jet bringing Zia home from a visit to Saudi Arabia. But the poorly trained terrorist who fired the SAM did not wait for the red signal in his viewfinder to turn green, indicating that the missile had locked on to its target, and the attack failed. A few weeks later the Pakistani press revealed that on the morning of 7 February Zia would be arriving at Lahore aboard his personal plane. The two terrorists drove to a public park beneath Zia's flight path with another SAM in their boot, waited for the Falcon jet to come into view and fired the missile. Once again, however, they ignored some of the instructions in the SAM-7 manual. This time the terrorist who fired the missile waited for the green signal but failed to follow the manual's advice that the aircraft should be watched through the viewfinder until it was hit. The missile missed its target, though on this occasion the Falcon pilot saw the SAM-7 being launched and took what turned out to be unnecessary evasive action. The strict censorship imposed by Zia's regime prevented any mention of the assassination attempt appearing in the Pakistani press. The two terrorists escaped back to Kabul.103 Two more SAM-7 missiles smuggled into Pakistan for a further attempt on Zia's life later in the year were seized by the police before they could be used. As Murtaza's paranoid strain became more pronounced, he suspected a bizarrely improbable plot between the Afghan regime and Zia to exchange him for the mujahideen leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and moved to New Delhi.104

Without any credible strategy to bring Zia down, the Centre could do little more than continue to publicize imaginary plots against him, chiefly from a supposedly secret Islamic opposition within the Pakistani armed forces. Some of Service A's fabrications appear to have deceived the Indian press. In 1983, for example, the Delhi Patriot published a text allegedly prepared by a clandestine cell calling itself the Muslim Army Brotherhood (Fauji Biradiri), which denounced the Zia regime as 'a despicable gang of corrupt generals . . . more interested in lining their own pockets than in defending the nation', who had 'betrayed the ideas of Pakistan's founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and were leading the country to ruin'. A recent history of Pakistan concludes: 'Nothing resembling the Muslim Army Brotherhood materialized in the more than ten years that Zia remained at the helm of state affairs, and it would appear to have been the invention of fertile minds in the neighbouring state [India].'105

In all probability, however, the 'fertile minds' were those not of the Indians but of Service A. Allegations of the Zia regime's corrup¬tion were also a regular theme in KGB disinformation. Zia was said to have large amounts of money in Swiss bank accounts, into which American arms manufacturers paid 10 per cent commission on their sales to Pakistan. KGB disinformation also claimed that Zia had a special plane in continual readiness in case he and his family had to flee the country.106

In Pakistan, as in India, some of the most effective active measures were based on fabricated evidence of US biological and chemical warfare.107 Operation TARAKANY ('Cockroaches') centred on the claim that American specialists in this field had set up a base in the US bacteriological laboratory at the Lahore medical centre, which was secretly experimenting on Pakistani citizens. Outbreaks of bowel disease in the districts of Lishin, Surkhab and Muslim Bag and the neighbouring areas of Afghanistan, as well as epidemics and cattle deaths in Punjab, Haryana, Jammu, Kashmir and Rajasthan in western India were alleged to be the result of the movement across the Pakistani border of people and cattle infected by American germ-warfare specialists. On n February 1982 the Karachi Daily News reported that Dr Nellin, the American head of a research group at the Lahore medical centre, had been expelled by the Paki¬stani authorities. The Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported on 13 February:
Following the expulsion from Pakistan of Dr Nellin for dangerous experi¬ments on the spread of infectious diseases, an American delegation of doctors is paying an urgent visit to Islamabad. Their aim is to hush up the scandal over the work of the Lahore medical centre and to put pressure on Pakistan not to make known the work which was carried out at the centre ... The fact that a group of American doctors has made such an urgent visit to Pakistan confirms that Washington is frightened that the dangerous experiments on new substances for weapons of mass destruction might be revealed. It supports the conclusion that Pakistan intends to allow the Americans to continue to carry out dangerous experiments, probably because these new weapons could be used against India, Iran and Afghanistan.
In May 1982 the KGB succeeded in taking the story a stage further by planting reports in the Indian press, allegedly based on sources in Islamabad, that the United States had stockpiled chemical and bacteriological weapons in Pakistan:
According to information received from local military sources, chemical reagents have recently been sent to Pakistan from the American chemical weapons arsenals on Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean and in Japan. They will be positioned in areas not far from Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Quetta and Peshawar. According to the sources, these reagents are the same as those used by the Americans during the Vietnam War. According to the same reports, the reserve of American chemical and bacteriological weapons in Pakistan is intended for possible use by American rapid-deployment forces throughout South and South-West Asia. Agreement on the stationing of chemical and bacteriological weapons in Pakistan was reached between Washington and Islamabad as early as August 1980 when the agreement on the stationing of the American bacteriological service on Pakistani terri¬tory was officially prolonged. Point 2. of Article 5 of this agreement gives the Americans, in the form of the International Development Agency of the USA, the right to evaluate periodically the work and make suggestions for its improvement. In practice this means that the Americans have full control over all aspects of the work in Pakistan on new forms of chemical, bacterio¬logical and biological weapons. This makes it possible for the USA indepen¬dently to establish how chemical reagents must be stored and used in Pakistan. Confirmation of this is the well-known work in the medical centre in Lahore where American specialists have invented new forms of bacteriological and chemical weapons.
Within the Centre, Operation TARAKANY was considered such a success that Andropov made a special award to the resident in Pakistan.108 Anti-American black propa****a, however, failed to disrupt the increasing co-operation between Zia and Washington. Though Zia spurned the offer in 1980 of a $4oo-million economic and military aid package from the Carter administration as 'peanuts' (a mocking metaphor doubtless derived from Carter's background as a peanut farmer), in 1981 he accepted an offer from the incoming Reagan administration of $3.2 billion spread over six years.109 During the war in Afghanistan the CIA supplied over $2 billion of covert assistance to the mujahideen through the Pakistani ISI. There was close liaison between the CIA and ISI with a series of exchange visits by their chiefs. Bill Casey and General Akhtar Abdul Rahman.110 KGB active measures had no discernible effect in undermining either Zia or ISI support for the mujahideen. Until Zia's death in 1988 in an air crash whose cause has never been convincingly explained, his regime proved one of the most stable in Pakistani history.111

When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's daughter, Benazir, became Prime Minister after Zia's death in 1988, she showed little enthusiasm for mujahideen operations in the final stages of the war.112 Had she become Prime Minister earlier or Zia been assassinated in 1982, the history of the war in Afghanistan would have been significantly different. The KGB had been right to identify Zia's personal commitment to opposing the Soviet invasion as crucial to Pakistan’s covert role in Afghanistan but had failed in its attempts to put effective pressure on him to diminish or end it.


NOTES
1. Gromyko, Memories, pp. 246-7.
2. vol. 3 pak., ch. 4, p. 13.
3. The earliest amount of the annual subsidy to the SPC recorded by Mitrokhin was for $20,000; his notes, however, do not mention the date. The SPC received $30,000 in 1974, and $25,000 in 1975 and 1976. The larger sum in 1974 is probably to be explained by the SPC in that year asking for an additional sum to found a bi-monthly newsletter in London;
vol. 3 pak., ch. 4, p. 13.
4. vol. 3 ban., ch. 2, p. 96.
5. vol. 3 pak., ch. 4, p. 18.
6. Ibid., p. 14.
7. vol. 3 pak., ch. 2, p. 3.
8. Ibid., p. 6; vol. 6, ch. 3.
9. vol. 3 pak., ch. 2, p. 5. Mitrokhin's notes give no indication of the intelligence GREM supplied.
10. Ibid., p. 3. Mitrokhin's notes give no indication of the intelligence that Hasan supplied. The fact that he had at least five successive FCD controllers (L. V. Shebarshin, N. V. Mardoniyev, G. V. Lazarev, A. V. Korneyev and S. P. Kuznetsov) strongly suggests that his material was of real significance. While Hasan was stationed in Saudi Arabia, where there was no legal KGB residency, the illegal KHALEF and a KGB Fifth Directorate officer masquerading as a pilgrim on the Haj were sent to make contact with him,
11. On the Eighth and Sixteenth Directorates, see Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, vol. i, ch. 2.1. Mitrokhin did not have access to their archives.
12. ALI's other controllers included Leonid Shebarshin; vol. 3 misc.,p. 115.
13. Shebarshin later concluded, possibly incorrectly, that Bhutto had been speaking with the approval of Ayub Khan; Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy, pp. 34-6.
14. vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, pp. 55-6.
15. Raza, Zulftkar Mi Bhutto and Pakistan, p. 237.
16. vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, paras. 240—47.
17. Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy, pp. 62-3. The resident's codename is given in vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, para. 245. Shebarshin refers to him only as Vasili B.
18. Raza, Zulftkar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, pp. 5-7.
19. Ibid.; Talbot, Pakistan, pp. 179-84.
20. vol. 3 pak., ch. 6, para. 205.
21. vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, paras. 246-9.
22. vol. 3 pak., ch. 6, paras. 206-24.
23. Kolbenev, 'Kak Pakistan raskololsia na dva gosudarstva', p. 75.
24. There is, however, no KGB file noted by Mitrokhin which says so explicitly.
25. vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, paras. 248-9. The 'Agartala conspiracy' trial turned into a public relations disaster for Ayub Khan. Evidence emerged that Pakistani police had tortured the alleged conspirators, and one of the defendants was murdered while in custody. The trial also offered Mujib a welcome opportunity to publicize the cause of the Awami League. The trial was never completed and charges were dropped as a precondition to meetings between opposition leaders and Ayub early in 1969. Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century, pp. 310-11.
26. This strategy may be safely deduced from the active-measures oper¬ations designed to discredit all the main opponents of the PPP and the Awami League.
27. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 101.
28. Kolbenev, 'Kak Pakistan raskololsia na dva gosudarstva', p. 79.
29. Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, pp. 251-4; Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century, p. 408.
30. Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, pp. 250-51.
31. Ziring, Bangladesh, pp. 88-9.
32. Mascarenhas, Bangladesh, p. 28.
33. Ziring, Bangladesh, pp. 84-9.
34. vol. 3 ban., ch. i, para. 415.
35. Ibid.; Directorate of National Security codename in vol. 3 ban., ch. 5, para. 441.
36. vol. 3 ban., ch. i, para. 416.
37. Politburo resolution No. N76/VIII OP, 2 Feb. 1973; vol. 3 ban.,ch.3, para. 434.
38. vol. 3 ban., ch. 2, paras. 430-31.
39. Mitrokhin noted no file on the foundation of BAKSAL.
40. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 3. Mitrokhin's notes do not identify the dates of their recruitment or give any information on the operations against the United States in which they were involved.
41. vol. 3 ban., ch. z, para. 432; ch. 3, paras. 437-9, 442-3.
42. vol. 3 ban., ch. 3, para. 444.
43. Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, p. 226.
44. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 104.
45. Ibid., para. 120.
46. Ibid., para. 109.
47. Ibid., para. in.
48. Ibid., para. 109.
49. Ibid., para. 107.
50. Ibid., para. 108.
51. Ibid., para. 103.
52. Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, pp. 250-51, 232-4.
53. Politburo resolution No. P 30/49 of 20 Oct. 1976, 'On our position
regarding the proposal of Pakistan that a top-level conference of developing countries be held'; vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 115.
54. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, paras. 115-18.
55. Anwar, The Terrorist Prince, p. 27.
56. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 119.
57. Zafarullah (ed.). The Zia Episode, pp. 127-9, 133-5.
58. vol. 3 ban., ch. 3, para. 444.
59. Ibid., para. 446.
60. Ibid., para. 441.
61. Ibid., paras. 448-51.
62. Ibid., para. 452.
63. Ibid., para. 453.
64. Zafarullah (ed.), The Zia Episode, pp. 154-6, 164 n. i.
65. Arif, Working with Z,ia, pp. 313-14, 412.
66. Gates, from the Shadows, pp. 146-8. The Carter administration had secretly decided to give non-military support to the mujahideen in July 1979.
67. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. i; Arif, Working with Zia, p. 315.
68. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 127.
69. Gates, from the Shadows, pp. 147-8.
70. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, paras. 127-45. In operation SARDAR-5, for example, carried out on the evening of 14 to 15 March, a further series of Service A leaflets purporting to come from 'a group of young officers' were distributed by KGB officers in Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Karachi. Other leaflets were distributed by post. All denounced Zia and demanded his overthrow.
71. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, paras. 127-45.
72. vol. 3 pak., ch. 7, para. 254.
73. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 127.
74. Ibid., para. 144.
75. Ibid., para. 129.
76. Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, pp. 181-4;
Urban, War in Afghanistan, p. 17.
77. Arif, Working with Zia, pp. 337-8. In October 1980 Arif visited CIA headquarters at Langley for talks on Afghanistan.
78. Barron, KGB Today, pp. 45-6. Mitrokhin did not note any file dealing with the expulsion.
79. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 128.
So. Anwar, The Terrorist Prince, p. 60.
81. vol. i, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, 'The KGB in Afghanistan', p. 140.
82. Anwar, The Terrorist Prince, pp. 43-5, 63-4.
83. vol. i, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, 'The KGB in Afghanistan', p. 140.
84. On the KGB and KHAD, see below, pp. 408-9.
85. Although on occasion Murtaza spoke mysteriously about possible Rus¬sian connections, it is possible that this derived from his habit of unsubstan¬tiated boasting rather than any conscious contact on his part with the KGB;
Anwar, The Terrorist Prince, p. 75.
86. Ibid., pp. 87-8. Though Mitrokhin's reference to discussions between Murtaza and Najibullah do not specifically mention these terrorist attacks, there can be little doubt that they were agreed between them since KHAD provided the bombs used.
87. vol. i, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, 'The KGB in Afghanistan', p. 140.
88. Anwar, The Terrorist Prince, pp. 95-8.
89. vol. i, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, 'The KGB in Afghanistan', p. 140.
90. Anahita Ratebzad, codenamed SIMA, appears on a list which Mitro¬khin compiled from KGB files of Afghan 'agents and confidential contacts';
vol. T, app. i. Unusually, however, the list fails to distinguish between the two categories. On Ratebzad, see below, p. 407.
91. Anwar, The Terrorist Prince, pp. 103-5. On Karmal's background as a KGB agent, see below, pp. 387, 403-4.
92. Anwar, The Terrorist Prince, pp. 107-9.
93. vol. i, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, 'The KGB in Afghanistan', p. 140.
94. Anwar, The Terrorist Prince, pp. iiz-T6. Colonel Qaddafi went back on an earlier agreement to allow the hijackers to force the crew to fly the plane to Tripoli.
95. vol. i, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, 'The KGB in Afghanistan', p. 145.
96. vol. i, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, 'The KGB in Afghanistan', p. 143. At the suggestion of Najibullah, the KGB recruited Agent FURMAN, on whom no further details are available, to select agents posing as refugees to target Afghan refugee communities in Pakistan and Iran; vol. i, app. i. Though Mitrokhin noted no further examples, the KGB doubtless recruited other agents with the same mission as FURMAN.
97. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 145. On KGB active measures to disrupt mujahideen operations, see below, pp. 409-10.
98. vol. i, ch. 7; Mitrokhin, 'The KGB in Afghanistan', p. 143.
99. See below, pp. 409-10.
100. Kryuchkov to Andropov, no. 155/796, 18 April 1981; vol. 3 pak., ch. 5,para. 150.
101. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 195.
102. Ibid., para. 143.
103. Anwar, The Terrorist Prince, pp. 130-37. Anwar's sources include both the terrorists who had attempted to shoot down Zia's plane with SAM-7 missiles. In 1992 Murtaza Bhutto declared in a newspaper inter¬view, 'I had two attacks carried out against General Zia. Once the computer of the missile fired at him malfunctioned, and the second time he had a hair's breadth escape.' Mitrokhin's brief notes on KHAD/KGB dealings with Murtaza Bhutto unfortunately do not go beyond the 1981 hijack.
104. After a series of abysmally planned, unsuccessful operations in 1984 (none of which seems to have benefited from KHAD support), and with most of Al-Zulfikar's members in jail, Murtaza announced its dissolution in the following year. His stormy career came to a violent end in September 1996 when he was shot dead by Pakistani police outside his Karachi house while his estranged sister, Benazir, was Prime Minister. Anwar, The Terrorist Prince, chs. 12-16.
105. Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century, p. 459.
106. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, para. 264. icy. See above, ch. 18.
108. vol. 3 pak., ch. 5, paras. 281-9. Mitrokhin's notes do not give details of the award to the resident.
109. Talbot, Pakistan, pp. 249-50. no. Arif, Working with Zia, pp. 318-19, 334-5, 342. in. Though the Pakistan air force board of enquiry found that 'the most probable cause' of the air crash was sabotage, a USAF accident-investigation team concluded that the most likely explanation was mechan¬ical failure. Talbot, Pakistan, pp. 284-5. 112. Arif, Working with Zia, p. 319.

(p.s. the information above is by no means a true reflection of events occured but it does provide a crude understanding about where our socalled "political" leadership stands....)

[umair_pak]

bhai maaf kardo aisa koi topic to post maat karo jo koi read na kar sakay.

[terraX]

well .. i thought the whole point of discussion baords was that people can engage in detailed arguments, instead of using this platform like a chat room...

anyway .. i really do appreciate your reply...

[terraX]

Eric Margolis
October 22, 2007

BENAZIR BHUTTO SUPS WITH THE DEVIL
NEW YORK - Just before departing for her dramatic return to Pakistan after years of self-imposed exile, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto told me of her joy at going home, and plans to rebuild democratic government in her nation.

Tragically, Benazir’s triumphant homecoming turned into a bloodbath as an attempt to assassinate her in Karachi left nearly 150 dead and hundreds wounded. While the western media blamed Islamic radicals, Ms Bhutto was quickly to accuse unnamed elements within the armed forces and security establishment. She was, in effect, blaming Gen. Musharraf, the man with whom she is now expected to cooperate under a US-brokered power-sharing deal.

Meanwhile, Washington, and even the First Lady Laura Bush, have been blasting Burma’s military junta for brutal repression. At the same time, Pakistan’s US-backed military junta, which receive $1 billion monthly in covert US payments, is waging war against its own restive people, thousands of whom have been killed by the armed forces. According to the Bush Administration’s thinking, shooting and beating rebellious Buddhist monks is evil; shooting and beating rebellious Muslim religious leaders is `anti-terrorism.’

I wished Benazir a bon voyage just before she left Dubai for her historic return home, and cautioned her that my extensive reader mail from Pakistan was running very much against her because of the deal she had made with military ruler Gen. Pervez Musharraf to allow her return. I reminded her of the old saying, `he who sups with the Devil had better use a very long spoon.’

The widespread view among Pakistanis is that Benazir’s return and impending political power-sharing with Musharraf was engineered by Washington to add a veneer of legitimacy of democracy to his discredited military regime. Unless Bhutto can quickly and decisively distance herself from Musharraf and his Bush Administration sponsors, and show she is really in charge as prime minister, she and her cause may be gravely tarnished.

The US-arranged back-room deal between Bhutto and Musharraf also flies in the face of her claims to be restoring democracy to troubled Pakistan. He is dropping criminal charges for corruption against her – which the general insists are legitimate and she denies – in exchange for her cooperation with his military regime. There is no disguising that this is a tawdry deal worked out with two of Washington’s staunchest Pakistani supporters.

As reported in my recent columns, the US has filled all senior positions in Pakistan’s powerful military and intelligence service, ISI, with pro-American generals approved by the Pentagon and CIA. Even if Musharraf is ousted or blown up, the US believes it can retain firm control over Pakistan and use its armed forces to wage war there and in Afghanistan against nationalist and Islamist forces battling western influence.

The military rules Pakistan. Musharraf and his American patrons run Pakistan’s military. So what is left for future prime minister Bhutto?
If Pakistanis conclude she is being cynically used, as it now appears, her political career could founder. If she can somehow push Musharraf and his generals back to their barracks, she will emerge triumphant. One suspects that Bhutto is hoping that Washington will abandon the highly unpopular Musharraf, ease him out of power, and make her the sole leader of Pakistan – with the US-dominated armed forces continuing to hold the real power behind the scenes.

Given the dizzying current political confusion between Musharraf, Bhutto, the Supreme Court, and exiled former PM Nawaz Sharif, it’s impossible to predict what will happen next. But one thing is certain: recent polls show a majority of Pakistanis believe America under President George Bush has launched a war against Islam, and that Musharraf is America’s agent in Islamabad. These disturbing beliefs could easily lead to increasing violence, even full-scale civil war.

Even if Musharraf and Bhutto eventually agree on some form of power-sharing, they will find themselves riding a tiger. America’s 2001 invasion and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan, and Washington’s ongoing efforts to control Pakistan’s government, have ignited a spreading regional insurrection against western influence.

If the simmering civil war in nuclear-armed Pakistan blows into a wider conflict, the result will be an exceptionally dangerous world crisis in which nuclear-armed India could quickly become involved. The growing threat of a US attack on Iran will only deepen and spread the danger. An explosion in Pakistan would also isolate US and NATO forces in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s most important national institution, the armed forces, has failed its duty to the nation. Instead of allowing itself to be rented like the sepoys in the mercenary armies of Britain’s 19th century Imperial Indian Raj to wage war on its own people, Pakistan’s military should be assuring its commanders serve the interest of the nation, rather than foreign powers. $1 billion a month rents a lot of cooperation, it is true. But Pakistan’s once proud soldiers have sold their honor cheap.

Copyright Eric S. Margolis 2007

[terraX]

battle of the Intelligences........ pakistan is in the middle of an international conspiracy to undermine her very inner heart of its foundation.... the two 'biggies' which joined their hands together (by force rather than conviction).. their relationship has reached a very important crossroad... the problem is .. their still remain a very few patriotic heavy weights who won't go to the extent of actually harming the sanctity of the very foundation of our existance .. the existance of the State of Pakistan ...... the real need of the day is that we show all our total support for our institutions at the critical stage; despite our hatred for their intervention into our political, economical and social fabric of our society ..... the real question that faces us now is.... are we willing to undermine the very foundation of our nation..... i say. give them another chance ... and defend our institutions at every level .. the amount of infiltration by foreign counterparts has reached a critical-mass.... the newspapers .. news channels all have people on their payroll... they are involved in a very serious "active measures" offensive against the state of Pakistan ... please don't be fooled by their "patriotism"..... it's their job .and they are damn good at it..... keep your eyes wide open ..... i beg all of u to please understand the gravity and seriousness of the situation.... the state only requires a total unconditional support of our government (atleast in the investigation of this horrendous terrorist event) .............

[terraX]

below is an aritcle published by an Indian think tank called "south asian analysis group"........... notice the similarities with Zardari's claim of insiders' involvement...... they are deliberately trying to implicate pakistani securoity services in this murderous act..... wake up guys...



Paper no. 2420
21-Oct-2007

Pakistan: Attempt to Kill Benazir Bhutto- An Update- International Terrorism Monitor- Paper No. 290

By B. Raman

The Karachi police investigating the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Mrs. Benazir Bhutto at Karachi on October 18,2007, shortly after she returned from eight years of political exile, seem to have ruled out the use of a car bomb by the unidentified perpetrators. They believe that the attempt was made by a suicide bomber, who had probably at least one accomplice. According to them, between 12 and 15 kilos of the high-grade RDX explosive were used in the explosion. The RDX is generally available only from the security forces and is rather expensive. This, if confirmed, would indicate the presence of accomplices in the security forces. This would also indicate that this could not have been a lone-wolf operation by an angry individual not belonging to any organisat